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Abstract—ARM TrustZone technology is widely used to pro-
vide Trusted Execution Environments (TEE) for mobile devices.
However, most TEE OSes are implemented as monolithic kernels.
In such designs, device drivers, kernel services and kernel
modules all run in the kernel, which results in large size of
the kernel. It is difficult to guarantee that all components of
the kernel have no security vulnerabilities in the monolithic
kernel architecture, such as the integer overflow vulnerability
in Qualcomm QSEE TrustZone and the TZDriver vulnerability
in HUAWEI Hisilicon TEE architecture. This paper presents
MicroTEE, a TEE OS based on the microkernel architecture.
In MicroTEE, the microkernel provides strong isolation for
TEE OS’s basic services, such as crypto service and platform
key management service. The kernel is only responsible for
providing core services such as address space management,
thread management, and inter-process communication. Other
fundamental services, such as crypto service and platform key
management service are implemented as applications at the
user layer. Crypto Services and Key Management are used to
provide Trusted Applications (TAs) with sensitive information
encryption, data signing, and platform attestation functions. Our
design avoids the compromise of the whole TEE OS if only one
kernel service is vulnerable. A monitor has also been added to
perform the switch between the secure world and the normal
world. Finally, we implemented a MicroTEE prototype on the
Freescale i.MX6Q Sabre Lite development board and tested its
performance. Evaluation results show that the performance of
cryptographic operations in MicroTEE is better than it in Linux
when the size of data is small.
Index Terms—TrustZone, Trusted Execution Environment,
Microkernel
I. INTRODUCTION
Mobile devices have been applied in many fields and can be
used to provide online payment, electronic banking and other
security-sensitive services. Because mobile devices store a lot
of data of great value, it becomes the focus of the attack.
Therefore, the security of mobile devices is very important.
*Corresponding author: Qianying Zhang, Capital Normal University,
No.105, West 3rd Ring North Road, Haidian District, Beijing, China.
The ARM TrustZone technology [1], [2] is widely used in
mobile devices to provide trusted execution environments for
security-sensitive services [3]–[6]. And it has become the
foundation of the security of mobile devices. Mainstream
OEMs like HUAWEI, SAMSUNG and Apple use TrustZone
to enhance the security of their products. However, most TEE
OSes are implemented based on monolithic kernel architec-
ture. The monolithic kernel architecture is more efficient than
microkernel, since components such as drivers and kernel
services run in the same address space. However, if any
of the kernel services were vulnerable, the whole TEE OS
would be compromised. The vulnerability in QSEE [7], for
example, can cause QSEE to write controlled data to arbitrary
secure memory. This vulnerability can be exploited to execute
arbitrary code in the context of QSEE. By executing mali-
cious code in the secure kernel, key extraction, Linux kernel
hijacking and bootLoader unlocking can be achieved. For
another example, in HUAWEI Hisilicon’s TEE architecture,
TrustedCore, a mistake in input structure bound-chek may lead
to arbitrary code execution in TEE, while system call bugs in
TEE kernel may allow a malicious TA to escalate privilege
[8].
Microkernel architecture is proposed to solve the above
problems of the monolithic kernel. In the microkernel architec-
ture, the kernel is only responsible for providing core services
such as address space management, thread management, and
inter-process communication. Other services such as device
drivers are implemented as user layer applications. The isola-
tion of the applications is guaranteed by the microkernel. As
long as the kernel does not crash, errors in one user layer
component will not affect operations of other components.
This avoids the compromise of the whole TEE OS if only one
kernel service is broken. There are currently some works on
microkernels, such as NOVA [9], Fiasco.OC [10], and Redox
[11].
In this paper, we design a TEE OS based on the microkernel,
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and then implement the necessary services of a TEE system in
the application layer, such as TA management, cryptography
services and platform key management. The microkernel pro-
vides an isolation mechanism for the above services and TAs at
the user layer. The design solves the security issue that exists
in the monolithic kernel: the whole TEE OS will compromise
if only one kernel service is vulnerable. Our contributions in
this paper are as follows.
• We build a TEE OS, MicroTEE, based on the microkernel
architecture. MicroTEE leverages the isolation mecha-
nism provided by the microkernel to isolate basic services
of the TEE OS.
• At the user layer, MicroTEE provides trusted applications
with security services such as Crypto Services and Key
Management, as well as trusted applications that provide
services to the normal world. Crypto services are used
to provide TAs with basic cryptographic functions such
as encrypting, signing and hashing. Key Management
service is used to encrypt sensitive information related
to the platform, and it is also used to prove the identity
of the device.
• A monitor is then added to be responsible for the switch
between the two worlds, including saving and restoring
the context and changing the NS bit.
• We implement a prototype of MicroTEE on the Freescale
i.MX6Q Sabre Lite development board and evaluate its
performance.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II
describes other works of building a trusted execution envi-
ronment. Section III introduces the information related to this
paper. Section IV describes the design details of the Micro-
TEE architecture. Section V describes the implementation of
MicroTEE. Section VI evaluates the prototype. Finally, we
conclude our paper and describe the future work in Section
VII.
II. RELATED WORK
This section describes other works of building a trusted ex-
ecution environment. Many studies have focused on providing
a trusted execution environment for applications on mobile
devices. We first introduce some popular commercial TEE
systems, and then introduce some academic and open source
TEE systems.
A. Commercial TEE Systems
ObC [12], [13] is a high security, low cost and open certifi-
cate management platform designed by Nokia Research Center
based on TEE. The software-only management of passwords,
keys, certificates and other credential information on mobile
devices is not secure enough and the cost of leveraging security
hardware to manage credential is too high. ObC can realize
the unified management of the whole life cycle [14] such as
the generation of user credential information, secure storage
and secure migration of user credentials information on mobile
devices. Based on this platform, ObC has realized applications
such as platform attestation [15], [16] and public transport
ticket system. Kinibi [17] is a TEE implementation built by
Trustonic (also known as t-base or Mobicore), and it has been
widely used in SamSung and Mediatek devices. T6 [18] is a
trusted kernel implemented by Shanghai Jiao Tong University
based on TrustZone technology. T6 is designed to build an
easy-to-use trusted computing platform that provides a high-
quality TEE for mobile devices. Qualcomm QSEE is also
widely used in mobile devices of various manufacturers, such
as SAMSUNG, ASUS and HTC.
B. Academic and Open Source TEE Systems
TLR [19], [20] is a lightweight, trusted language runtime
framework with programming interfaces designed and imple-
mented by Microsoft Research and University of Lisbon for
high-level languages such as C#. TLR allows developers to
separate the secure sensitive logic of an application from the
rest of the application. The support offered by ARM TrustZone
combined with the flexibility of the .NET programming envi-
ronments allows TLR to offer a secure, yet rich programming
environment for developing trusted mobile applications. OP-
TEE [21] is an open source project developed by the open
source organization Linaro. This project covers all the software
components required by TEE software architecture: the user
layer client in the normal world, the TEE device driver in the
Linux kernel and the trusted OS in the secure world. OP-TEE
conforms to the GlobalPlatform specifications and provides
standard APIs for the development of TA. ANDIX OS [22]
developed by Graz University of Technology is a multitasking
TEE OS. ANDIX OS is compatible with the GlobalPlatform
specifications. It realizes the isolation of secure tasks and the
mobile operating system through TrustZone technology. Open-
TEE [23], a virtual, hardware independent TEE implemented
in software, is developed by the University of Helsinki. Open-
TEE conforms to GlobalPlatform specifications [24]. It allows
developers to develop and debug trusted applications with the
same tools they use for developing software. Open-TEE is
designed to function as a daemon process in user space, and
it mainly includes two components: manager and launcher.
Open-TEE ensures that trusted applications developed by it
can run on any TEE hardware that conforms to the Glob-
alPlatform specifications.
From the above works, we can see that most TEE OSes
are implemented as monolithic kernels. Although they have
relatively high execution efficiency, they cannot avoid the
shortage of monolithic kernel which increases attack surfaces
due to the large size of the kernel. There is a lack of
separation of privileges in the monolithic kernel architecture.
A vulnerability of a component in the TEE OS can directly
cause the entire system to be taken over by an attacker. For
example, the vulnerability found in QSEE can be exploited to
execute arbitrary code. We designed the MicroTEE using the
memory isolation and protection mechanisms provided by the
microkernel architecture. It can implement device drivers and
applications at the user layer, using a microkernel to ensure
the isolation of the applications. As long as the kernel is
not compromised, a problem with one component will not
compromise the security of the whole system.
III. PRELIMINARIES
A. ARM TrustZone Technology
ARM TrustZone technology is a set of hardware extensions
for ARM processors. It allows the device to run in two
different processor modes, called normal world mode and
secure world mode. Each mode represents a virtual processor
that provides a separate execution environment. Software and
hardware resources, such as peripherals and memory, are also
divided into two parts. Secure world is usually used to run
the security critical software components. It can access all the
software and hardware resources, including the resources of
the normal world. Normal world can only access the hardware
and software resources of the normal world. The NS bit is
used to indicate which world the processor is running in. The
memory and peripheral controllers use NS bit to check whether
a particular resource request is allowed.
TrustZone technology adds a mode to the ARM processor,
called monitor mode(Figure 1), which is responsible for the
switch between the secure world and the normal world. The
monitor mode belongs to the secure world. The entry to
monitor can be triggered by executing a dedicated instruction,
the Secure Monitor Call (SMC) instruction, or by a subset of
the hardware exception mechanisms. The IRQ, FIQ, external
Data Abort, and external Prefetch Abort exceptions can all be
configured to cause the processor to switch into the monitor
mode. The monitor is responsible for saving the context of the
current world and switching back to the context of the other
world.
Secure world
Monitor
Kernel
Trusted App Trusted App
Normal world
Kernel
Normal App
TZ driver
Normal App
scheduler
User
Privileged
User
Privileged
Fig. 1. The ARM TrustZone Architecture
Because TrustZone cannot resist physical attacks, studies
have provided ways to improve it. The design in [25] leverages
SRAM to provide a root of trust for TrustZone. It provides
security against both physical and software attacks. SoftME
[26], CaSE [27], TrustShadow [28], and CryptMe [29] provide
TEE system with approaches to resist physical attacks.
B. SEL4 Microkernel
The seL4 [30], [31] microkernel is an operating system
kernel designed to be a secure, safe, and reliable foundation
for systems in a wide variety of application domains. As a
microkernel, seL4 provides a small number of services to
applications, such as creating and managing virtual address
spaces, threads management, and inter-process communication
(IPC). The kernel is implemented in approximately 8700 lines
of C code. Other services, such as device drivers, run as normal
applications in the independent address space at the user layer.
They are typically managed by the kernel. The biggest feature
of seL4 is that it is the world’s first fully formally verified
kernel, proven to be bug-free, and can withstand common
attacks such as buffer overflow attacks [32], [33].
The seL4 microkernel provides a capability-based access-
control model. In order to perform an operation provided by
the kernel, the application must invoke the capability it has,
which has sufficient rights for the requested service. Endpoint
objects are responsible for the IPC communication between
threads. The TCB object is used to describe the corresponding
thread, and each TCB has a CSpace and a VSpace. CSpace
is used to hold all the capabilities of a thread, and VSpace is
used to manage the virtual address space. Both of the CSpace
and the VSpace can be shared with other threads.
IV. ARCHITECTURE DESIGN
This section describes the details of the MicroTEE design,
including the design of each component, the relationships be-
tween components, the communication between components,
and the boot process.
A. MicroTEE Overview
The main components of MicroTEE are TEE OS, the
Monitor, Root Task and security services. Its architecture is
shown in Figure 2. The TEE OS is responsible for provid-
ing the fundamental core services, such as TA creation and
management, address space management and inter-process
communication. The Monitor is responsible for the switch
between the secure world and the normal world, including
saving and restoring the context of the corresponding world,
passing parameters and data, and so on. The Root Task is
the first user layer application that runs after kernel startup.
It is responsible for taking over all unused resources of the
system, creating and managing other TAs. Security services
can provide TAs with basic security services such as data
encryption and decryption, key management and signing. The
components communicate with each other by calling the API
of the IPC mechanism provided by the TEE OS. When an
interrupt is triggered, the kernel is responsible for sending the
interrupt signal to the corresponding handler.
B. The Monitor
The monitor is responsible for the switch between the secure
world and the normal world. It can be entered into by the
SMC instruction. In MicroTEE, when an SMC instruction is
invoked, the CPU switches to the monitor mode. Then the
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Fig. 2. The Architecture of MicroTEE
corresponding handler, SMC handler, is invoked according to
the monitor vector table base address stored in the Monitor
Vector Base Address Register (MVBAR). The current state
of the system, whether secure or normal, is depended on
the NS bit in the Secure Configuration Register (SCR), and
SMC handler stores the current world’s context on the stack.
The monitor modifies the NS bit to the corresponding value
and loads the context of the corresponding world. We add a
new SMC system call, MicroTEE SMC(), that allows applica-
tions at the user layer to enter the privileged layer and then
execute the SMC instruction to trigger the world switch. After
entering into the monitor mode, the SMC handler is executed
to save and restore the context and pass the command ID and
associated parameters.
C. TEE OS
Our TEE OS is implemented based on the microkernel
architecture. As a secure kernel, the microkernel provides a
small number of core services for applications, such as ad-
dress space management, TAs management and inter-process
communication.
TAs Management. MicroTEE provides a thread control
block (TCB) that manages the information about each TA,
including stack pointer, program counter, register values and
priority. The kernel guarantees that the information of one TA
will not be accessed or changed by other TAs. This enables
MicroTEE to provide a separate address space for each TA and
allows MicroTEE to ensure that each TA is isolated from each
other. MicroTEE schedules each TA according to its priority.
Communication Mechanism. Microkernels typically pro-
vide a kernel service for IPC mechanism, such as endpoint
object in seL4. In MicroTEE, the IPC communication mech-
anism is used for communication between TAs and security
services. The Root Task creates a kernel service between it
and each TA for IPC communication. The Root Task also
creates a kernel service for communication between each
TA and each security service. TCBs of TAs and security
services are configured when the Root Task creates them. The
configuration includes the permission to call the kernel service
for IPC communication. The sender places the message in a
mailbox-like kernel service via a system call, and the receiver
receives the corresponding message via another system call.
In this way TAs can provide services to the normal world
through the Root Task. TAs can also request services from
security services.
Memory Management. At boot time, MicroTEE pre-
allocates the memory required by the kernel itself, including
the code, data, and stack sections. MicroTEE kernel then
creates a Root Task and hands over the remaining unused
memory to the Root Task. TAs and security services are
created and managed by the Root Task. When a new TA needs
to be created, the Root Task creates the corresponding TCB
first. The page table is then created for the new TA and mapped
to the new TA by saving a pointer to the root page directory
into the TCB. When a TA is destroyed, MicroTEE destroys
the TCB that represents the TA. MicroTEE removes the data
from the memory and then retrieves the memory.
Interrupt Handling. In the design of MicroTEE, interrupts
are registered in the kernel. When an interrupt is triggered, an
interrupt notification signal is sent through the kernel to the
particular interrupt handler. And then the handler processes
the interrupt. When the user space handler completes interrupt
processing, it sends a signal to the kernel, informing that the
kernel can send new interrupts to the handler.
D. Root Task
In MicroTEE, the Root Task is the first user layer ap-
plication that runs after the kernel boots. It is created and
provided with the minimal boot environment by the kernel.
This environment consists of the Root Task’s TCB, CSpace
and VSpace. After the kernel boots, all unused resources are
managed by the Root Task, so the Root Task has the highest
priority at the user layer. Other TAs are created and managed
by the Root Task. Therefore, we treat the Root Task as a
manager. When the normal world sends a request, it passes
parameters, including the command ID and args, to the secure
world through the monitor. The Root Task sends a service
request to the appropriate TA according to the command ID
received from the normal world. If the command ID does not
exist, the Root Task ignores this request. By calling the SMC
instruction from the Root Task, the processor switches back
to the normal world.
E. Security Services
MicroTEE provides TA with two security services, Key
Management and Crypto Services. They are used to provide
key and cryptography services to TA, respectively.
Key Management. This security service provides services
related to the platform’s keys (assuming that they are pro-
vided by the vendor and already stored in trusted hardware),
including a Root Key and a Device Key. The root key is
a symmetric key used for encryption and decryption of the
confidential information, such as keys of TAs. The Device Key
is an asymmetric key used to prove the identity of the device,
by which a remote entity can verify whether the device is
legitimate or not.
Crypto Service. It is responsible for providing basic cryp-
tography service. We provide TAs with cryptographic algo-
rithms by this crypto service, including symmetric encryption
algorithm AES (128bits), asymmetric encryption algorithm
RSA (2048bits) and hash algorithm SHA-256. A TA requests
the corresponding algorithm by sending a request to the Crypto
Services through the IPC mechanism. When this service
completes the operation, the result is returned to the TA.
F. Trusted Applications
Each TA is created by the Root Task and has its own address
space. When a TA is created, the Root Task assigns a unique
command ID to the TA. The functionality of a TA can be
customized to provide a service to the normal world. Here, we
implement a sample service which increases 1 to the value it
receives. When the normal world needs to request this service,
it transfers the command ID and parameters to the service
by invoking the SMC instruction. The Root Task receives
command ID 3 and parameter 0 from the normal world, and
then sends a request to the corresponding TA. Finally, the Root
Task returns the result to the normal world. Figure 3 shows
the process of the Root Task calling a TA.
1) The Root Task sends a service request to TA3 based on
ID 3.
2) TA3 receives ID 3 and parameter 0 through the IPC
mechanism.
3) TA3 executes a++ for 0.
4) TA3 returns the result 1 to the Root Task.
5) The Root Task receives the result.
Secure world
Root Task
Key 
Management
Crypto Service
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ID 1:TA1
ID 2:TA2
ID  3:TA3
MicroTEE
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 Recv(3,0)
 Reply(3,1)
 Recv(3,1)
TA2
TA1
Fig. 3. The Process of Root Task Calling TA
G. Secure Boot
At boot time, attackers can perform downgrade attacks,
which replace secure software images in flash with tampered
images. If the system boots an image from flash without
checking its integrity, the system is vulnerable. So we build a
chain of trust for the software in the secure world, which is
built from the ROM that is not easily tampered with.
In our design, the boot process is shown in Figure 4.
A device starts from the Boot ROM, which loads the first
bootloader image, with the manufacturer’s public key and a
signature at the end of the image. The hash of the public key
is hard-coded into the ROM. The ROM first verifies the public
key with the hash and then uses the public key to verify the
signature of the first bootloader image. After the verification
succeeds, the first bootloader loads the secure world image and
second bootloader image into memory and verifies the integrity
of the images. If the verification succeeds, the bootloader
transfers its control to the TEE OS. After that, the second
bootloader loads the mobile OS image and verifies it. The
secure boot guarantees that the initial state of the device is
trusted.
Reset
Boot ROM
1st Bootloader
1st Bootloader
MicroTEE+
2nd Bootloader
MicroTEE
System Running
2nd BootloaderMobile OS
Fig. 4. Secure Boot Process
V. PROTOTYPE IMPLEMENTATION
We have implemented a MicroTEE prototype on the
Freescale i.MX6Q Sabre Lite development board. This section
describes the implementation of all the components, including
the Monitor, the MicroTEE kernel based on the seL4 micro-
kernel and the security services.
A. The Monitor
The monitor is responsible for the switch between the
normal world and the secure world. It is configured during
platform initialization, including setting the stack of monitor
mode and writing vector base address into Monitor Vector
Base Address Register (MVBAR). The stack is used to store
CPU contexts of the normal world and the secure world, and
the MVBAR holds separate exceptions table of the monitor
mode.
The secure world switches to the monitor mode by invoking
the SMC instruction. At the user layer, the processor switches
to the privilege mode by calling our newly added system
call, MicroTEE SMC(command ID, args). Then the processor
executes the SMC instruction in the privilege mode (SMC can
only be invoked in the privilege mode). The parameter args is
used to pass other information, such as the address of shared
memory. The values of these parameters are passed to the TEE
OS through the physical registers r0 and r1, because these
registers are not changed in the monitor. Finally, the secure
world can perform services based on command ID and data
passed from the normal world. The SMC exception handler in
the monitor mode, SMC handler(), does the work of saving
the current world CPU context and restoring the other world
CPU context. Since only the secure world is studied in this
paper, the context of the secure world is saved and restored in
the monitor.
B. TEE OS and Security Services
We build the MicroTEE Kernel based on the seL4 mi-
crokernel. MicroTEE provides user layer TAs with TCB to
manage the relevant configuration information. It also provides
assurance that each TA’s address space is isolated from each
other. Applications implement IPC communication between
them by calling system calls provided by MicroTEE.
In MicroTEE, security services are implemented as user
layer applications, including Key Management and Crypto Ser-
vices. We add LibTomCrypt to our MicroTEE which provides
the following cryptographic services: symmetric cryptography
algorithm AES, asymmetric cryptography algorithm RSA and
hash algorithm SHA-256. A TA sends the request including
the service ID and data to the corresponding security service.
And then the operation result is returned to the TA. Key
Management service manages the platform’s Root Key and
Device Key, and these Keys don’t leave Key Management. Key
Management provides encryption of confidential information
related to the device and attestation of platform identity. When
a TA needs to encrypt confidential information or to prove
the identity of the device, the TA sends a request to the Key
Management service. The Key Management service returns the
result to the TA after the encryption or signature operation is
completed. The Crypto Services provides basic cryptography
services such as AES, RSA and SHA-256. Similarly, the
corresponding algorithm is called according to the request,
and the result is returned to the TA.
C. Secure Boot
After the power of the system is reset, the Boot ROM loads
the first bootloader’s image into the memory, which includes
the first bootloader’s native image and digital signature. After
the image is loaded into memory, its integrity needs to be
verified by Boot ROM. If the verification succeeds, the images
of MicroTEE OS and the second bootloader will be loaded into
memory by the first bootloader and similar verification steps
will be carried out. After the verification, MicroTEE OS will
boot. In the boot procedure, the microkernel has to perform an
integrity check of the Root Task before launching it. And then
the image of mobile OS is loaded into memory and verified
by the second bootloader. Finally, mobile OS boots.
VI. EVALUATION
A. Performance of IPC Communication
The IPC mechanism is only used to send critical short mes-
sages. For long messages, a shared memory should be used.
We leverage the sel4bench tool to evaluate the performance of
IPC. The sel4bench evaluates the performance of IPC when
the message length is 0 and 10 words. A TA, as the sender,
requests services from the Security Services. The test results
are shown in Figure 5, each of which is an average of 16 calls.
When the message length is 0, the time consumption for a TA
to send the message is 295.8 ns, and the time consumption for
the Security Services to return the result is 307.6 ns. When
the message length is 10 message words, the time cost for
TA to send the message is 862.1 ns, and the time cost for the
Security Service to return the result is 853.8 ns. The increase
in time cost is caused by reading and writing messages. When
the length of the IPC communication message is less than 10,
the IPC communication time cost is less than 1 µs. Therefore,
when messages sent through IPC communication are small,
the impact of IPC communication on system performance is
little.
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Fig. 5. Time of IPC
B. Overhead of World Switch
The time cost of world switch is also measured. Mea-
surement begins with a TA executing an SMC system call,
MicroTEE SMC(command ID, args), and ends with the TA
continuing to execute. The world switch involves switching
into the monitor from the TA and returning to the TA from
the monitor. Table 1 shows the overhead of a world switch.
Test results show that the cost of the switch between worlds is
high. This is because a world switch requires multiple context
switches. A context switch from the user layer to the kernel is
required, and a context switch from the kernel to the monitor
is also required.
C. Cryptographic Services
We have measured the performance of symmetric cryptogra-
phy algorithm AES, asymmetric cryptography algorithm RSA
and hash algorithm SHA-256 respectively. Figure 6 shows
TABLE I
SMC CALL OVERHEAD
World Switch Overhead(ms)
SMC Call and Return 2.002
the performance results of symmetric cryptography algorithm
AES operating on the data of different sizes in MicroTEE. We
can see that the performance of encryption and decryption is
similar and stable. Figure 7 shows the performance of AES
in Linux. When the size of data is small, the performance of
AES in MicroTEE is better than in Linux. The reason is that
when measuring time consumption, the system call to get the
time introduces a context switch. The context switch of the
Linux kernel service takes a large proportion when the size of
data is small. The context switch of the microkernel has a fixed
overload and is lighter than the context switch of Linux. When
the size of data is close to 1MB, cryptographic computations
take the most proportion, and the time used for context switch
is negligible. So the performance of AES in MicroTEE and
Linux is similar.
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Table 2 shows the performance of the signing and verifying
operations of the RSA algorithm in MicroTEE, where the
length of the key is 1024 bits and 2048 bits, respectively.
When the length of the key is increased from 1024 bits to 2048
bits, the time required for the signing operation is increased
by about 4.6 times, and the time required for the verifying
operation is increased by about 3.2 times. The choice of key
length is the result of a balance of security and performance.
TABLE II
1024&2048BITS-RSA
Operation type 1024bits(µs) 2048bits(µs)
Sign 13851.4 63821.6
Verify 777.6 2482.8
Figure 8 shows the performance of the hash algorithm SHA-
256 for the data of different sizes in MicroTEE and Linux.
The evaluation result of SHA-256 in MicroTEE and Linux is
similar to AES. MicroTEE performs better than Linux when
the data size is small. When the data size increases, the time
is mainly used for cryptographic calculations. So when the
data size is larger than 256K, SHA-256 performs similarly
in MicroTEE and Linux. Combined with the performance
of AES and SHA-256, MicroTEE has an advantage: the
kernel context switch is lightweight and has less impact on
application operations.
1
1
.7
3
8
1
4
.5
3
2
1
5
.8
5
3
1
7
.1
9
3
1
7
.3
7
7
1
7
.7
2
3
1
7
.9
4
7
1
7
.7
0
7
1
7
.7
2
5
1
7
.7
2
3
1
7
.6
9
8
1
7
.6
7
4
1
7
.5
4
7
9
.8
4
4 1
2
.0
8
6
1
2
.5
8
5
1
3
.1
6
1
1
3
.6
2
1
3
.7
0
6
1
5
.4
0
8
1
6
.5
5
1
7
.1
3
3
1
7
.4
7
6
1
7
.6
3
8
1
7
.7
5
2
1
7
.7
7
5
6 4 B 1 28B 25 6B 512B 1K 4K 16K 32K 64K 128K 256K 512K 1M
P
e
rf
o
rm
a
n
ce
(M
B
/s
)
MicroTEE Linux
Fig. 8. Performance of SHA-256
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This paper introduces the design, implementation and eval-
uation of MicroTEE based on microkernel architecture. In
our design, the microkernel is used as the secure kernel to
provide the core services for TEE, and other security services
necessary for TEE are implemented as user applications of the
microkernel. These security services provide TAs with basic
cryptography services such as encryption, signing and hash.
We have implemented a MicroTEE prototype on the Freescale
i.MX6Q Sabre Lite development board. The evaluation shows
that the performance in the MicroTEE is stable and it is better
than the performance in Linux in the aspect of providing
cryptography services when the size of data is small.
In the future, we intend to extend the trusted computing
functions on this architecture, including integrity measure-
ment, data sealing and remote attestation to improve the
security of our system. Integrity measurement is responsible
for verifying the integrity of TA images loaded into memory
before execution. Data sealing is responsible for binding infor-
mation to a particular service. Remote attestation is responsible
for proving the state of the device to a remote party.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
This work was supported by the National Natural Sci-
ence Foundation of China (61602325, 61802375, 61876111,
61877040, 61572331), and the Project of Beijing Municipal
Education Commission (KM20190028005).
REFERENCES
[1] ARM, “Security technology building a secure system using trustzone
technology (white paper),” ARM Limited, 2009.
[2] B. Ngabonziza, D. Martin, A. Bailey, H. Cho, and S. Martin, “Trustzone
explained: Architectural features and use cases,” in 2016 IEEE 2nd
International Conference on Collaboration and Internet Computing
(CIC). IEEE, 2016, pp. 445–451.
[3] S. D. Yalew, G. Q. Maguire, S. Haridi, and M. Correia, “T2droid:
A trustzone-based dynamic analyser for android applications,” in 2017
IEEE Trustcom/BigDataSE/ICESS. IEEE, 2017, pp. 240–247.
[4] D. Hein, J. Winter, and A. Fitzek, “Secure block device–secure, flexible,
and efficient data storage for arm trustzone systems,” in 2015 IEEE
Trustcom/BigDataSE/ISPA, vol. 1. IEEE, 2015, pp. 222–229.
[5] Y. Zhang, S. Zhao, Y. Qin, B. Yang, and D. Feng, “Trusttokenf: A
generic security framework for mobile two-factor authentication using
trustzone,” in 2015 IEEE Trustcom/BigDataSE/ISPA, vol. 1. IEEE,
2015, pp. 41–48.
[6] R. Liu and M. Srivastava, “Protc: Protecting drone’s peripherals through
arm trustzone,” in Proceedings of the 3rd Workshop on Micro Aerial
Vehicle Networks, Systems, and Applications. ACM, 2017, pp. 1–6.
[7] D. Rosenberg, “Qsee trustzone kernel integer over flow vulnerability,”
in Black Hat conference, 2014, p. 26.
[8] D. Shen, “Attcaking your ”trusted core” exploiting trustzone on android,”
in Black Hat conference, 2015.
[9] U. Steinberg and B. Kauer, “Nova: a microhypervisor-based secure vir-
tualization architecture,” in Proceedings of the 5th European conference
on Computer systems. ACM, 2010, pp. 209–222.
[10] TU-Dresden, “Fiasco.oc,” https://os.inf.tu-dresden.de/fiasco/.
[11] R. Developers, “Redox,” https://www.redox-os.org/.
[12] K. Kostiainen, J.-E. Ekberg, N. Asokan, and A. Rantala, “On-board cre-
dentials with open provisioning,” in Proceedings of the 4th International
Symposium on Information, Computer, and Communications Security.
ACM, 2009, pp. 104–115.
[13] K. Kostiainen et al., “On-board credentials: an open credential platform
for mobile devices,” 2012.
[14] K. Kostiainen, N. Asokan, and A. Afanasyeva, “Towards user-friendly
credential transfer on open credential platforms,” in International con-
ference on Applied cryptography and network security. Springer, 2011,
pp. 395–412.
[15] K. Kostiainen, A. Dmitrienko, J.-E. Ekberg, A.-R. Sadeghi, and
N. Asokan, “Key attestation from trusted execution environments,” in In-
ternational Conference on Trust and Trustworthy Computing. Springer,
2010, pp. 30–46.
[16] K. Kostiainen, N. Asokan, and J.-E. Ekberg, “Practical property-based
attestation on mobile devices,” in International Conference on Trust and
Trustworthy Computing. Springer, 2011, pp. 78–92.
[17] Trustonic, “Kinibi,” https://www.trustonic.com/.
[18] TurstKernel, “T6,” https://www.trustkernel.com/.
[19] N. Santos, H. Raj, S. Saroiu, and A. Wolman, “Using arm trustzone
to build a trusted language runtime for mobile applications,” in ACM
SIGARCH Computer Architecture News, vol. 42, no. 1. ACM, 2014,
pp. 67–80.
[20] N. Santos, H. Raj, S. Saroiu, and Wolman, “Trusted language runtime
(tlr): enabling trusted applications on smartphones,” in Proceedings of
the 12th Workshop on Mobile Computing Systems and Applications.
ACM, 2011, pp. 21–26.
[21] Linaro, “Op-tee documentation,” 2019.
[22] A. Fitzek, F. Achleitner, J. Winter, and D. Hein, “The andix research
osłarm trustzone meets industrial control systems security,” in 2015
IEEE 13th International Conference on Industrial Informatics (INDIN).
IEEE, 2015, pp. 88–93.
[23] B. McGillion, T. Dettenborn, T. Nyman, and N. Asokan, “Open-tee–
an open virtual trusted execution environment,” in 2015 IEEE Trust-
com/BigDataSE/ISPA, vol. 1. IEEE, 2015, pp. 400–407.
[24] GlobalPlatform, “Tee internal core api specification,” 2018.
[25] S. Zhao, Q. Zhang, G. Hu, Y. Qin, and D. Feng, “Providing root of
trust for arm trustzone using on-chip sram,” in Proceedings of the 4th
International Workshop on Trustworthy Embedded Devices. ACM,
2014, pp. 25–36.
[26] M. Zhang, Q. Zhang, S. Zhao, Z. Shi, and Y. Guan, “Softme: A software-
based memory protection approach for tee system to resist physical
attacks,” Security and Communication Networks, 2019.
[27] N. Zhang, K. Sun, W. Lou, and Y. T. Hou, “Case: Cache-assisted secure
execution on arm processors,” in 2016 IEEE Symposium on Security and
Privacy (SP). IEEE, 2016, pp. 72–90.
[28] L. Guan, P. Liu, X. Xing, X. Ge, S. Zhang, M. Yu, and T. Jaeger,
“Trustshadow: Secure execution of unmodified applications with arm
trustzone,” in Proceedings of the 15th Annual International Conference
on Mobile Systems, Applications, and Services. ACM, 2017, pp. 488–
501.
[29] C. Cao, L. Guan, N. Zhang, N. Gao, J. Lin, B. Luo, P. Liu, J. Xiang, and
W. Lou, “Cryptme: Data leakage prevention for unmodified programs
on arm devices,” in International Symposium on Research in Attacks,
Intrusions, and Defenses. Springer, 2018, pp. 380–400.
[30] K. Elphinstone and G. Heiser, “From l3 to sel4 what have we learnt
in 20 years of l4 microkernels?” in Proceedings of the Twenty-Fourth
ACM Symposium on Operating Systems Principles. ACM, 2013, pp.
133–150.
[31] P. Derrin, D. Elkaduwe, and K. Elphinstone, “sel4 reference manual,”
NICTA-National Information and Communications Technology Aus-
tralia, 2006.
[32] G. Klein, K. Elphinstone, G. Heiser, J. Andronick, D. Cock, P. Derrin,
D. Elkaduwe, K. Engelhardt, R. Kolanski, M. Norrish et al., “sel4:
Formal verification of an os kernel,” in Proceedings of the ACM SIGOPS
22nd symposium on Operating systems principles. ACM, 2009, pp.
207–220.
[33] B. Blackham, Y. Shi, S. Chattopadhyay, A. Roychoudhury, and
G. Heiser, “Timing analysis of a protected operating system kernel,”
in 2011 IEEE 32nd Real-Time Systems Symposium. IEEE, 2011, pp.
339–348.
